Rob Ford, preview Future elections at the Guardian on May 1 highlight how Liberal Democrats, Green and reform are likely to bring about great benefits. Furthermore, Recent Prospect article, Peter Kellner It suggests the control of workers and conservatives. This suggests that even the general election, where the Post (FPTP) voting system offers great advantages, has ended forever. I began to be more skeptical, but I thought it was worth discussing more deeply as I am an amateur about these issues.
Important evidence to support the view that UK multi-party politics does [1] What you’re here to stay is a trend in voting stocks since the very end of World War II. Below is a more complete version of the numbers Kellner provides in his article:
Since 1951, the vote share of the UK’s Labour and Conservatives has fallen from nearly 90% in 2024 to less than 60%. But the final observation is important. Koelner argues that in my view it is convincing as 2024 represents a return to a downward trend in vote share for the two main parties, as Brexit is biased politics, and 2017 and 2019 are outliers. But is this really a change in a series of steps due to well-defined political developments?
Until 2010, the decline in Lab+Con Share was primarily about increasing share of liberal/SDP liberal alliance/liberal Democrats, with a clear step change here in the 1970s. From 1945 to 1970, liberal vote share vibrated at less than 10%, but from 1974 to 2010 it averaged around 20%. In addition to the rise in nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, the increase in UKIP in the 2000s (to achieve a 3% vote share in 2010) has a more modest effect over this period. In 2015, Libdem’s vote collapsed, but UKIP voted, and Green Party votes barely compensated. Even discounts on 2017 and 2019 as Kellner suggests, 2024 looks like another step change. Reform, Libdems and Greens have a total vote share of 33%.
The argument I want to present is that these two steps change occurred when the two key parties approached and then left the average voter location. To understand more recent movements, we need to look at two policy spaces rather than one dimension.
In the diagram above, the center is where the average voter is and can change over time as voters’ opinions change. From 1945 to 1970, both parties were closer to the centre of election opinion, with workers a little more left-wing and socially liberal, while conservatives were more right-wing and socially conservative. [2] Most of the political action was about economics, and votes were primarily class-based. FPTP ensured that there was little scope for other parties to gain significant vote shares.
The 1970s brought about inflation and industrial unrest. As a result, public opinion suggests that they have used income policies to reduce inflation to separate themselves from both the union movement and the Labour Party. Regarding the above diagram, labor changed to the left as the policy did not change with public opinion. This led to a step increase in liberal votes in 1974. Conservatives in the 1970s (especially after Thatcher became leader) acted economically correctly. The gap between the workforce and Tories was the biggest when labor vote share collapsed in 1983, and the SDP Liberal Alliance gained a vote share almost as large as labor. After 1983, the Labour Party gradually returned to its economic centre and again gained power in 1997.
At this point, conservatives are now far from the centre than labour on economic issues, and as a result, they have started more campaigns on social issues, particularly immigration. Voting is no longer class-based and has increased age-based (as older voters tend to be more socially conservative). This may have allowed conservatives to traditionally invade the working class field, but at first, at least economic benefits meant that socially conservative rhetoric was not consistent with behavior. This led to the emergence of UKIP, a populist right-wing party, which began to gain important vote shares.
Skip to 2024, Labour has now adopted several moderate socially conservative policy positions, and has also adopted more right-wing policies in terms of public service delivery. In an attempt to counter the threat from Farage, the Conservative Party adopted even more stringent socially conservative policies (mainly Brexit) and became increasingly populist in nature. This had two effects. The first, relatively minor thing was giving the Green Party a top national vote share of 6.4%. Second, and perhaps more importantly, since World War II, it was to give the socially liberal libdem the highest seating total.
Under FPTP, the SEATS counts to everything and the votes do not share anything. If the conservatives remain as is, then this is a populist party that advocates a very extreme socially conservative view from a populist standpoint, this makes socially liberal but economically right-wing voters very reluctant to vote for them. The liberal Democrats in 2024 managed to win many of these votes, resulting in the highest seat total since World War II with a much lower vote share than most periods from 1974 to 2010.
The 2024 general election, which is seen in this way, was not the latest point on the inevitable trend towards multi-party politics, but was the result of a change in the policy stances of two major parties. Essentially, the Conservatives first moved to neoliberalism, then to right-wing populism, and now the workers have moved in that direction. As a result, whether this situation persists or is marked more will depend on whether the two key parties remain in their current location or return to their former location.
If conservatives continue to focus on competing with Farage, Ribdem has a good chance to maintain their high seat totals, but their range of further growth is modest Last year, I was second with only 27 seats.. [4] Otherwise, the main beneficiary of this reform/Tory battle is labor. If the worker stays where he is now, Green Party is second to 39 seats of work, so both the vote and seat total can be increased. [3] If Farage can be persuaded by an election agreement or the Conservative Party can collapse, then the UK will have a decent outcome of becoming a four-party system, each party representing one of the quadrants in the diagram above.
However, it is also possible that 2024 represents a low point for the two major political parties. Workers can only return to moderate social freedom positions for purely election reasons, and at the same time, as in the early 2000s, they can increase their taxes to fund better public services. Under the new leader, conservatives could focus more on reclaiming the Liberal Democrats rather than on reform votes. In such a situation, Labour could narrow down the green vote using the prospect of the Tory government’s return, while conservatives could narrow down both libdem and reform using the same tactics.
Both scenarios are possible. In particular, fewer tactical votes in council elections and more protest votes will result in increased pressure on two major political parties, changing policy positions and tactics before the next general election. If this analysis is correct, what is clear is that the continuous decline or revival in the fate of the two major political parties is primarily in their own hands.
[1] This is really a question about the UK, as we’ve been with us for a while in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, let alone multi-party politics.
[2] In this diagram, the center is the average voter’s opinion and can change over time in terms of policy position. For example, because World War II voters have become more socially liberal. Without a doubt, in 1945, the view shifted to the left, and so the Labour Party’s radical policy agenda was able to win that election, so conservative policies changed to the left to reflect that.
[3] Of course, competition with existing or new left-wing parties will hinder this.
[4] The main danger of Libdems is that labor is economically unpopular among right-wing voters, and conservatives argue that Libdems supports minority labour governments.
